University of Richmond

UR Scholarship Repository
Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies Faculty
Publications

Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies

2016

Why Life Now?
Ladelle McWhorter
University of Richmond, lmcwhort@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/wgss-faculty-publications
Part of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, and the Feminist Philosophy
Commons
Recommended Citation
McWhorter, Ladelle. Foreword to Feminist Philosophies of Life, by Hasana Sharp and Chloe Taylor, xi-xvi. McGill-Queen's University
Press, 2016.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Women, Gender and Sexuality Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

FOREWORD

Why Life Now?

As we struggle to understand and prepare ourselves for climate change,
the effects of globalized neoliberal capitalism, and violence (both governmental and extra-governmental) on a planetary scale, we also struggle to
name what it is that we cherish and hope to foster and protect as well as
what it is that, of itself, opposes the forces that may well destroy us. One of
the words that has emerged in this context is life.
Philosophers do well to pay close attention to any concept that attains
such centrality and exercises such power in our thinking, which is one
reason to be grateful for the thinking collected in Feminist Philosophies of
Life and for the editorial work that brought it together. The collection could
not be more timely. Yet it is also puzzling, prodding a reader to wonder:
What is it that brings these very different essays together? They all speak
of life, but when they do so, do they speak of the same thing?
Editors Sharp and Taylor are aware of the question, and the answer
they give has to do not so much with the thematic content of the essays
but rather with their strategic intent. Something has changed in feminist
thinking since the turn of the twenty-first century, and that change is reflected here, they suggest. Whereas so much feminist scholarship in the
last century was dedicated to exposing "the tendency of discourses to normalize and exclude;' as they write in the introduction, these essays strive
to move beyond those discourses and imagine and cultivate new ways to
speak, think, and act. And a necessary step in that project is "to ask what
life is." No one essay answers that question or even addresses it directly.
But the great value of the collection as a whole lies in its creation of an

occasion for philosophical meditation on the question and its implications and possibilities.
I confess to skepticism regarding the ontological importance of the
question; as a student of Foucault's work, I much prefer to treat powerful
terms - which life most definitely is - as effects of and operators within
historical and political forces. Nevertheless, I believe the editors are right
to raise it as a general intellectual imperative. What is life? What is life?
What is life doing here, among us, in our work, in this feminist philosophical moment?
In this collection - and in fact in much of the work now referred to as
feminist new materialisms and posthumanism - the term life operates in
a number of ways and has multiple meanings and effects. These are not
necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive - in fact, some functions
and meanings reinforce or shade into each other - but there are differences. And it is important, I think, to consider these differences in their
differences as well as in their overlappings and similarities. Although I
would like to consider how life functions in posthumanisms and new material"isms in general, here I will simply identify and briefly explore a few
of the divergences that occur in the present collection.
Herein life names, first and obviously, the course that one traverses between birth and death. Life is not a general phenomenon but an oft repeated - though never precisely replicated - particular one. It is my life,
your life, the president's life, the life of the janitor who cleans my classroom. As Jane Barter writes (following Adriana Cavarero and opposing
Giorgio Agamben), there is no such thing as bare life; there is always a
"who;' and a singular who at that. It is not clear to me whether Barter would
attribute a who to the lives of nonhuman beings, but many contributors
to this collection might well do so; not only my life and your life, then, but
also those of the doe and the oak tree, and the twenty-one-day life of the
evasively buzzing house fly. Each is particular, though we may not be able
to discern it in its material and temporal particularity.
Related to this first way of employing the word life are the ways in which
some of these authors use Gilbert Simondon's concept of individuating,
Stephen D. Seely most overtly. For Simondon, as Seely explicates, life is or
at least fundamentally involves the activity of individuation. This is not
to say that any living being ever becomes a complete individual totally
separated from all others, but that each emerges out of an indeterminate
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multiplicity in an ongoing process of differing from its own field of emergence. Particularity, or singularity, though not individualism, is affirmed;
differentiation takes precedence over replication of the same. Life is this
activity of differentiation, ever differing from "itself" - that is, from whatever is.
Another way that life functions in these essays is as a means to emphasize the occurrence of activity without total predictability, without
epistemic or ontological certainty. Life is change - self-transformation (or
perhaps a middle-voiced event of materially transforming itself, with no
determined and determining telos). It points, therefore, at what always ultimately escapes the forces styled and ranged to catch it, manipulate it,
direct it, and manage it - forces such as the carceral eugenic complex that
Lisa Guenther identifies in chapter 11. Life "is" resistant to conceptualization and instrumental rationality. It names a material force that is, finally,
unnamable and untamable.
Yet another function of life in many of these essays is to oppose the
assumption of passivity in material existence. Understanding life as
matter's self-organizing activity rather than as some kind of nonmaterial
force added to or acting on materiality "destabilizes anthropocentric
and humanist ontological privilege; writes Astrida Neimanis in chapter 2. Indeed, these authors assert, matter needs no external nonmaterial
impetus or mentality; it is its own agent fo~ change. A sort of Spinozist
monism runs through much of this collection, a nonreductive materialism that celebrates matter as a (self-)organizing, structuring, transforming
force - in other words, that celebrates life not or not only as particularities
of becoming, but as a general phenomenon of material transformation of
planetary and perhaps cosmic proportions.
Celebration, but also alarm, animates many of these essays. Life is what
is most endangered; life is what must be protected; harm to life must be
averted to whatever extent possible. Climate change, mass extinction,
discrimination against the disabled, violence against queer people, murders ofindigenous women of Manitoba, eugenic incarceration - all these
forces assail not just individuals and classes but also life itself. For that
reason, as well as others, these issues are of great feminist concern. Life as
trans-formal phenomenon is not only valorized, therefore, but also powerfully desired and fearfully defended. Is life emerging here as another name
for the good? At times, one might be justified in suspecting so. At other
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times, it can have no such metaphysical meaning. And that tense difference is worth pondering at length as feminists take up this work for further
exploration and elaboration.
Life points in many directions in this collection, then: life as singular
temporal becoming, life as nonteleological event, life as active material
self-organization, life as to be desired and protected from harm. Life works
very hard. But why? Why life, and why now?
Many feminists now search for ways to talk about ways of being that are
not accommodated by - and in fact are largely inexpressible in - Enlightenment humanistic and liberal discourses. We witness a broad rejection,
here and elsewhere, of atomized individualism and valorized mentality;
of the purely spiritual; of hard distinctions between subject and object,
self and other, Homo sapiens and our coevolving cohort of eukaryotes
and even prokaryotes. But this rejection is not new to feminist thought.
Feminist philosophy and cultural critique have taken Enlightenment Man
as a major target for four decades. We need only remember the work of
Genevieve Lloyd or Susan Griffin or Carolyn Merchant. Feminists have
virtually always understood Cartesian dualism and liberal political theory,
with its emphasis on rational self-mastery, to exclude the feminine, the
effeminate, and anyone or anything that might be labelled as such, including "nature." Knowledge figured as the disinterested subject's mastery of
the inert object is an old and well-treated theme. Critique of Enlightenment Man is not new among feminists, which has prompted many critics
to suggest that there is nothing really new at all about the supposedly new
feminist materialisms.
What may be new, as Sharp and Taylor suggest, is this particular concerted effort to leave Enlightenment Man behind, which here and elsewhere now often takes the form of an attempt to produce an ontology that
simply excludes him. The Enlightenment Man is decentred - totally marginalized if not eradicated - in favour of an all-inclusive, down-to-earth,
inherently self-overcoming concept of life.
This decentralization is a bold move beyond critique toward creation. It
signals a break, albeit an incomplete one, with the feminist theory of the
twentieth century, a decision to be done with the work of finding the fault
lines in masculinist cultures, and to turn instead to the work of building
new conceptual frameworks and systems for thinking. In that context, life
is a versatile new building material - the twenty-first century's concrete or
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synthetic polymer - whose potential for conceptual formation and structuring is currently under exuberant exploration. What can life do? Where
can thinking with life take us? 'These essays embody preliminary answers
to those questions, even when they do not overtly state them: unlike man,
life is inclusive of the nonrational; unlike man, life is immanent in and as
the material world. And insofar as life differs in these ways from man, it
enables thinking to diverge and venture.
But there are reasons to worry about all this. As Lynne Huffer warns,
there are dangers in using life as our means of departure from Enlightenment thinking. In our time, she writes, life is a problem. She means this
in a very specific Foucauldian sense: life is problematized; it is a site of
interrogation, analysis, and struggle. Far from a happily neutral given, it is
a particularly fraught and intensified node of power/knowledge.
Huffer offers a brief but very important genealogy of this notion of
life, likening it to Foucault's description of sex in The History of Sexuality, volume 1. Sex is a product of biopower, according to Foucault, not the
natural given upon which power seizes. Sex is the node formed where biopower groups together, "in artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological
functions, conducts, sensations, pleasures, and it enabled one to make use
of this fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a
secret to be discovered everywhere." 1 Huffer suggests that in both Judith
Butler's and Elizabeth Grosz's work, life functions very much as sex functioned in biopolitical discourses of sexuality as they emerged in the late
nineteenth century. Life is an artificial unity surreptitiously comprising
disparate elements but posing as the common key to understanding ourselves and our world. If that is a plausible claim, the obvious danger is that
life tends to operate as an allegedly transhistorical signifier; it purports to
have no history and no political investments. But it does, and because it
does, we feminists are not in control of how it operates through our discursive productions.
If life is to be a major force in organizing feminist thinking now, Huffer
cautions us to be very deliberate and as clear as possible about life's histories and politics. We need a conception oflife that is alert in its own manifestations of those forces and their contingencies. She suggests that the
conception that Foucault offers is less apt to lead in directions that feminist materialist~ do not want to go than are less genealogically informed
conceptions. Foucault's concept of life is unstable in that, as Huffer puts it,
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"the evidentiary matter that grounds our belief in something called life
is, by definition, fragmented, incomplete, and shifting:'2 His genealogical
approach - in particular his archival research - focuses on "material traces
oflives" {note the plural) and thus "can break open the metaphysical frame
of life itself that characterizes some feminist renaturalization projects:'3
Whether we use Foucault's techniques or others, we must take care to
attend the materialities of singular lives, multiple and mortal, not life as a
sort of universal presence.
The space of philosophical meditation created by Feminist Philosophies
of Life is a crucial one, therefore. The project of thinking how to think thinking thinking - without Enlightenment Man is among the most important facing us. We are rapidly living into an unforeseeable future that
will demand of us a new ethos, new ethea. Will life help us imagine a path
into it? Is that what life is doing here?
Ladelle McWhorter
August2015

NOTES

1 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 11 154.
Ibid., 122.
3 Ibid.
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